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Book Review
Desmond Manderson: Kangaroo Courts and
the Rule of Law. The Legacy of Modernism.
Routledge, Abingdon 2012.
Luis Gómez Romero*
Kangaroo Courts represents the height of the recent work that Desmond Manderson 
has developed around the nexus between ‘law and literature’ and the rule of law.1 
Manderson’s approach to this matter is unique in taking seriously both literary 
theory and the aesthetic aspects of literary texts—strange though it may seem, 
this is an authentic revolution in the field of law and literature. Manderson rightly 
observes that back to their very origins the discourses constructed around the 
conjunction of ‘law and literature’ have suffered from two structural weaknesses: first 
‘a concentration on substance and plot’ and second ‘a salvific belief in the capacity 
of literature to cure law or perfect its justice’ (Manderson 2012a, 9). The first fails to 
question the ‘mimetic fallacy’ that regards the imitation of nature or reality as the 
main function of art (Manderson 2011, 108-118; 2012a, 10-17).2 The second fails to 
question the ‘romantic fantasy’ that sets the purpose of art in ‘healing the world’s 
wounds’ (Manderson 2011, 118-121; 2012a, 17-20).3
Manderson contends that what makes literature worth reading is neither 
its coherence with the world, nor the morality it endorses. The aesthetic ideals 
of modernism, which so dramatically transformed the landscape of literature, 
philosophy and politics around the turn of the 20th century, reject precisely these 
claims. Modernist texts are noteworthy because of their quest for aesthetic autonomy 
through ‘the eternal recurrence of play and form and the priority of voice over event’ 
(Manderson 2012a, 16). From a modernist perspective, thus, reading a novel as a 
1 See Manderson 2011, 2012, 2012b and 2012c.
2 See, for example West 1985 and 1986, Posner 1986, Nussbaum 1995 and Lacey 2008.
3 See, for example Nussbaum 1995, Ward 2003 and Williams 2005.
* Lecturer in the School of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia. 
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‘normative framework to convey information concerning “the real world”’ miserably 
forsakes to appreciate ‘the dimensions of form and style in works of literature as 
central elements of our experience and enjoyment of them’ (Manderson 2011, 116-
117). Modernism simply has not happened yet in the academic field that we call ‘law 
and literature’—that is, the study of literature by scholars who are mainly interested 
in law—as it clings to a time ‘before the crisis of modernity’ that shook both law’s 
and literature’s claims to ‘the certainty and objectivity of the written text’ (Manderson 
2012a, 20). In this regard, it must be noted that while modernism and modernity 
are related, they should also be sharply distinguished. In Manderson’s words:
Modernity might be said to encompass the monumental changes in society 
and in belief that the Enlightenment set in motion and that accelerated and 
ramified with the industrial revolution right through the nineteenth century. 
Modernism […] refers to the paroxysms which ensued when the worlds of the 
arts and ideas began to depict, understand, and respond to them. Some would 
date modernism as early as the publication of Rimbaud’s Un Saison en Enfer in 
1873, with its ruthless rejection of romance and its ringing final sentence: ‘One 
must be absolutely modern’. Well before the First World War […] Sigmund 
Freud and Henri Bergson, Cézanne, Malevich, Kandinsky and the Blue Rider 
School, Stravinsky’s Firebird Suite and Rite of Spring and Schoenberg’s Second 
String Quartet had all broken with key tenets of aesthetic and social convention. 
(Manderson 2012a, 26.)
The ascension of modernism overlaps with the ‘crisis of modernity’—Manderson 
regularly uses the noun ‘crisis’ in its singular form—that was triggered by World 
War I, which in turn virtually destroyed the trust in the systems, beliefs and 
institutions whereon the so-called Western civilization was erected: reason, science, 
industrialization, capitalism and liberal democracy. To put it briefly, modernism is a 
response to the ‘crisis of modernity’. Modernism signifies ‘a commitment to individual 
over social good, a sense of rootlessness and exile, and, coupled with an emphasis 
on the varieties and uncertainties of individual subjectivity, the most comprehensive 
critiques of representation and the most radical experiments in form’ (Manderson 
2012a, 27).
In each of the arts, stylistic variation and reinterpretation—even parody or 
pastiche—of the past canon were central to the modernist period. In the literary field, 
modernism entails therefore an understanding of literature ‘as a site of questions not 
of answers, of the creation of textual doubt and ambiguity not certainty’ (Manderson 
2011, 108). Modernism destabilized the syntactic and logical articulations which had 
previously communicated a story to the reader by focusing instead in fragmentation, 
indeterminacy and singularity both in voice and perspective (Manderson 2012a, 19). 
Irony is thus central to our understanding of literary modernism as it juxtaposes ‘the 
 This is the case, just to mention a couple of examples, of James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), whose encyclopaedic 
intertextuality displays multiple levels of conceptual and formal structures; or Virginia Woolf ’s Mrs. Dalloway 
(1927), which follows the stream of consciousness of its central characters through twenty-four hours.
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play of levels and registers within a text, and the tensions between levels of meaning 
which thereby undermine the most innocent of speech acts’ (Manderson 2011, 121; 
2012a, 17).
Nonetheless, the emergence of new artistic styles that stressed the importance 
of subjective experience was not the only effect of the horrors that emerged from the 
Great War’s trenches. Romanticism regained momentum. Even though liberals have 
consistently identified romanticism either with reactionary or plainly totalitarian 
politics (Talmon 1960; Berlin 1999), Manderson appropriately avoids this misleading 
account of its political, philosophical and aesthetic ramifications. Based on the 
seminal work of M. H. Abrams on romanticism, Manderson identifies as its central 
philosophical feature ‘a metaphysics of integration, of which the key principle is that 
of the “reconciliation” or synthesis of whatever is divided, opposed, and conflicting’ 
(Manderson 2012a, 17; Abrams 1971, 177-183). The romantic sensibility is bound 
up with the painful conviction that in modern capitalist reality something precious 
has been lost, at the level of both individuals and humanity at large. Romanticism 
resists therefore the alienation of certain essential human values—qualitative values 
as opposed to the purely quantitative exchange value that predominates in capitalist 
modernity—and promises instead the overcoming of difference, the accomplishment 
of inward plenitude and the instauration of harmony among human beings.
Manderson diagnoses a growing dilemma between introspection, individual 
self-assertion, and the claims of the collective among Western intellectuals as 
modernism moved in crescendo into the political tensions of the 1920s. In the years 
that followed World War I ‘many writers, artists and thinkers were virulently opposed 
to the legal and social history of positivism and rejected in almost identical terms its 
obsession with mechanics, systems, technology and rules’ (Manderson 2012a, 0). 
In the writings of the German New Romantics—Eugen Diederichs, Paul de Lagarde 
and Julius Langbehn, among other authors—‘we can observe the same fusion of 
nature, tradition, custom, religion; the same belief in justice as hierarchical and 
leadership as manifest’ (Manderson 2012a, 1). I think George Orwell effectively 
illustrates Manderson’s claim when he plunges into the belly of modernism and 
describes the experience of transiting from radical aesthetic individualism to the 
desire of collective harmony and transcendence in the following terms: ‘Suddenly 
we have got out of the twilight of the gods into a sort of Boy Scout atmosphere of 
bare knees and community singing’. (Orwell 1968, 510).
Orwell sharply describes in this way the cultural mood that fostered the 
reactionary constituent of modernism, which Manderson defines as ‘romanticism 
which has taken a political and nihilistic turn’ (Manderson 2012, 15). No author 
better shows the implications for the rule of law of this resurgent romantic spirit 
than Carl Schmitt, whose work virtually dissolves law into the mutually enticing 
forces of politics and emotions. Manderson acknowledges that the association of 
Schmitt with romanticism is not obvious: his Political Romanticism is precisely 
‘a vitriolic diatribe against political romanticism’ (Manderson 2012a, 2; Schmitt 
2011). Nonetheless, Schmitt clearly fits into a pattern of anti-modernist legality that 
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reinstates transcendent decision as the key element of the legal system. Manderson 
contends that ‘[i]f he dismissed political romanticism as “the sovereignty of the ego”, 
his solution merely substituted the egotism of the sovereign’ by transferring it to an 
original and charismatic authority that is ‘underived from any institutional structure’ 
(Manderson 2012a, 3; Schmitt 2011, 65).
Schmitt’s critique of legal positivism was forged out of the ashes of the Great 
War. 1922 marks a critical turn in his thought. The publication that year of Politische 
Theologie exhibited his decisive rejection of the liberal rule of law as expressed through 
positivist legal theory. Contrarily to the basic idea of the rule of law, which is expressed 
in the phrase ‘government by law and not by men’—that is, that the government shall 
be ruled by the law and subject to it, making it possible for individuals to foresee with 
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers, and to plan their affairs 
on the basis of this knowledge (Raz 1977, 195-198)—, Schmitt had come to believe 
that justice could not be achieved even by the best of rules. Schmitt’s key theses can 
be encapsulated in the following threefold principle: i) ‘Sovereign is he who decides 
the exception’; ii) ‘[t]he exception is that which cannot be subsumed [… it] appears 
in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must 
first be brought about’, and iii) ‘[t]he exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology’. (Schmitt 1985, 5, 13 and 36). For Schmitt, justice was not found 
in legal structures but in their exceptions; not by reference to established procedures 
but by summoning the voice of the people and the force of the leader who would 
condense and amplify it.
The exasperation that Schmitt and the New Romantics expressed about the 
logical and moral limits of positivism resonates today in us as forcefully as it did 
in 1922. The attack on the Twin Towers and their collapse on 11 September 2001 
gave birth to the brave new world of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. Both 
listlessness in regulating economic powers and corruption have spread all over the 
world dystopian realities in the form of a devastating economic crisis.5 Law seems 
helpless to constrain public powers that have resuscitated a Hobbesian conception 
of untrammeled sovereignty as well as private powers that do not accept any legal 
limits in their quest for profit.
The traditional positivist conceptions of language, objectivity and meaning in 
law seem highly inefficient to address these challenges. The rule of law is lethally 
imperilled, but we still do not have anything replace it. Manderson asserts that D. 
H. Lawrence’s work constitutes a timely platform for reassessing our problems with 
justice and judgment because no less than him ‘we still face the terrible problem of 
what to do once we can no longer believe in our old habits of thought: for belief has 
died though the habit of believing lingers on’ (Manderson 2012a, 3). Kangaroo—a 
novel Lawrence wrote in the sea side town of Thirroul on  south coast of Sydney where 
he and his wife Frieda stayed for six weeks during the Australian winter of 1922—
responds precisely to the disorientation caused by the Great War and its implications 
5 For a recent account on the present worldwide dystopian realities, see World Economic Forum 2012 
(specifically, the section titled ‘Seeds of Dystopia’, 16-19).
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for art, politics and law. Kangaroo faithfully depicts the allure of totalizing ideologies 
that promise the redemption of justice and community under the authority of a wise 
and loving leader—Duce, Führer, or Caudillo—, but ultimately Lawrence recoils 
from them and renounces his own fondness for authoritarian politics. Lawrence 
actually changed his mind about the need of leadership for achieving justice. In 
a much quoted letter written to Witter Bynner—dated 13 March 1928—Lawrence 
categorically asserted:
The hero is obsolete, and the leader of men is a back number. After all, at the 
back of the hero is the militant ideal: and the militant ideal, or the ideal militant 
seems to me also a cold egg. We’re sort of sick of all forms of militarism and 
militantism [...] the leader-cum-follower relationship is a bore. And the new 
relationship will be some sort of tenderness, sensitive, between men and men 
and men and women, and not the one up one down, lead on I follow, ich dien 
sort of business. (Lawrence 1991, 321.)
Manderson’s reading of Lawrence’s Kangaroo as a dialogic and polyvalent text 
provides us with a basis to state that this letter does not inaugurate a new stage in 
Lawrence’s thought but rather continues an earlier one whose origins can be traced 
up to his brief sojourn in Australia.6 Kangaroo tells the story of Richard Lovatt 
Somers—Lawrence’s alter ego—, an English writer whom a group of war veterans 
who call themselves ‘Diggers’ tries to recruit to the cause of a right-wing takeover in 
Australia. The righteous authority of their leader, a lawyer born Benjamin Cooley 
and known as ‘Kangaroo’, is their only political creed:
I want to keep order. I want to remove physical misery as far as possible […] 
And that you can only do by exerting strong, just power from above […] I should 
try to establish my state of Australia as a kind of Church, with the profound 
reverence for life […] as the motive power […] Yet there must be law, and there 
must be authority. But law more human, and authority much wiser […] Man 
needs a quiet, gentle father who uses his authority in the name of living life, 
and who is absolutely stern against anti-life. I offer no creed. I offer myself, my 
heart of wisdom, strange warm cavern where the voice of the oracle steams in 
from the unknown; I offer my consciousness, which hears the voice; and I offer 
my mind and my will, for the battle against every obstacle to respond to the 
voice of life, and to shelter mankind from the madness and the evil of anti-life. 
(Lawrence 1923, 126-127.)
Kangaroo’s pretended legitimacy comes from ‘the ability of a true leader to act 
wisely outside of the rules, to realize that the unity of the people transcends vested 
interests, and to receive the allegiance of his subjects […] by virtue of his natural 
6 Philip Sicker argues that Lawrence’s retreating from leadership politics lasted only until 1929, at which 
time his Grand Inquisitor essay reasserted the importance of the hero (Sicker 1992). However, as Jad Smith 
observes, the question of whether or not Lawrence eventually reaffirmed his interest in leadership politics 
matters less than his hesitation while he was writing the ‘leadership novels’ (Smith 2002, 21).
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and manifest authority’ (Manderson 2012a, 58). Somers initially succumbs to the 
seduction of these ideals of cohesive community and charismatic leadership as 
Kangaroo directly appeals to his contempt for egalitarianism and corrupt modernity. 
He regards Australia as a loathsome ‘terre democratic’ without any sense of ‘class 
distinction’, where ‘[t]he proletariat appoints men to administer the law, not to rule’ 
(Lawrence 1923, 18). Somers craves instead ‘[t]he mystery of lordship […] the mystic 
recognition of difference and innate priority, the joy of obedience and the sacred 
responsibility of authority’ that ‘democracy and equality try to deny and obliterate’ 
(Lawrence 1923, 121).
Manderson suggests that to understand Kangaroo’s argument properly we 
must pay attention not just to Somers, but to all its characters and to the different 
voices that struggle in each character’s conscience (Manderson 2012a, 125). Somers’ 
voice in the novel is constantly undermined and destabilized by others voices: by 
the narrator, by his wife Harriet and even by Somers himself through an internal 
dialogue between the yearning to lose himself into collective unity and the desire 
for solitude. Somers repeatedly berates himself as he acknowledges he is merely a 
‘preacher and a blatherer’, a plain fool and even a ‘beastly’ and ‘detestable little brat’ 
(Lawrence 1923, 319, 327-328 and 332).
Indeed, Harriett’s is the most powerful voice that subverts Somers’ pretensions. 
Manderson calls our attention to a particular example which illustrates how Lawrence 
ironically modulates his own voice, citing his own opinions in contexts that subtly 
disrupt them (Manderson 2012a, 125-126). On a cold day at the beach—Lawrence 
tells us—Somers’ hat is caught by the wind and carried into the waves. He clumsily 
manages to rescue it (Lawrence 1923, 322). Chilled and wet, he continues to lecture 
Harriet on the way home about the convenience of reawakening ‘the aristocratic 
principle’ that advocates the recognition of ‘the innate difference between people’. 
Harriet retorts brutally: ‘Aristocratic principle! […] You should have seen yourself, 
flying like a feather into the sea after your hat’. (Lawrence 1923, 325). Later, he sits 
in a little barrel with a rusty tin-lid to warm himself near the fire. She pours scorn 
on him again: ‘Old tin lids! How can you sit on it? […] Is that your aristocratic 
principle?’. (Lawrence 1923, 326).
The novel’s embodiment in multiple characters provides resistance to the 
claims and arguments of each of them. Somers’ engagement in active dialogue with 
other characters’ voices transmutes his viewpoints about politics and justice. As 
Somers gradually abdicates the hierarchical and collectivist creed he endorsed at the 
time he arrived to Australia, he ruminates that ‘[l]ife makes no absolute statement 
[…because] Life is so wonderful and complex, and always relative’. (Lawrence 1923, 
31). In the end, he refuses to be seduced by the promises of any man to truly possess 
the insight and authority that Kangaroo vindicates. Somers just wants to be left 
‘alone by himself, alone with his own soul, alone with his eyes on the darkness which 
is the dark god of life’. (Lawrence 1923, 330). Thus, he finally declines Kangaroo’s 
suffocating embrace:
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Don’t love me. Don’t want to save mankind. You’re so awfully general, and your 
love is so awfully general […] Let’s be hard, separate men […] you’re such a 
Kangaroo, wanting to carry mankind in your belly-pouch, cozy, with its head 
and long ears peeping out. You sort of figure yourself a Kangaroo of Judah, 
instead of a Lion of Judah […] Let’s get off it, and be men, with the gods beyond 
us. I don’t want to be godlike, Kangaroo. I like to know the gods beyond me. 
Let’s start as men, with the great gods beyond us. (Lawrence 1923, 25.)
Why did Lawrence turn his back on reactionary romanticism in this way? Manderson 
thinks that the answer lies in the novel itself. Mikhail Bakhtin’s writings on the novel 
provide us with the necessary elements to understand Lawrence’s ideological evolution 
through Kangaroo. Bakhtin highlights the novel as an inherently fragmentary and 
double-voiced genre. The most powerful feature which Bakhtin recognizes in the 
novel is its heteroglossia or polyphony, its characteristic multiplication of voices and 
perspectives. In speech, ‘every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape 
the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates’. (Bakhtin 1981, 
280). The novel reproduces this aesthetical—as well as ethical—quality of speech.
Bakhtin defines the novel as ‘a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even 
diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized’. 
(Bakhtin 1981, 262). Its distinctive ‘dialogic imagination’ gives a particular voice to 
each of the characters and sets these voices against one another. The novel’s multiple 
voices appear in many different mutual relations—of stylization, parody, hidden 
polemic, and so on. Along these lines, the novel points not just to a mosaic of voices, 
but at the same time to their transformation under the communicative pressure of 
their contexts of utterance. This is what Bakhtin means when he speaks about the 
novel as a literary genre that is basically ‘dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, 
humor’ and ‘elements of self-parody’, and also imbued with ‘indeterminacy, a certain 
semantic open-endedness’ and ‘a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving and 
contemporary reality’ (Bakhtin 1981, 7).
If we read Kangaroo from a Bakhtinian perspective, we will most probably 
conclude—as Manderson does—that Lawrence did not wrote Kangaroo, but Kangaroo 
rewrote Lawrence (Manderson 2012a, 90-111). Bakhtin’s claims are both echoed in 
D.H. Lawrence’s own essays on the novel, and performed in his ‘leadership novels’ 
(Manderson 2012a, 12-1, 152; Hyde & Clark 1993-199, 10-11). In his ‘Study 
of Thomas Hardy’, Lawrence contends that an authentic work of art ‘must contain the 
essential criticism of the morality to which it adheres’ in order to create ‘the conflict 
necessary to every tragic conception’ (Lawrence 1985, 89). Kangaroo similarly refers 
to the ‘laws of polarity’, which are described as the movement between two flows, 
one sympathetic and loving, the other mighty and authoritarian. Lawrence writes 
that ‘[i]n the absolute triumph of either flow lies the immediate surety of [human] 
collapse’. (Lawrence 1923, 35-355).
The Great War brought on the crisis which stimulated Lawrence to work 
through the tensions between opposing principles that he refused to cap by a 
fruitless appeal to some ideal state of concord. Kangaroo embodies ‘an earnest if 
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perverse commitment: not to resolve its contradictions and tensions but to see in 
them its main character’s essential activity’ (Manderson 2012c, 92). Polarity is 
neither synthesis nor harmony, but plain opposition between ‘forces that cannot be 
compromised since we are committed too much to both’ (Manderson 2012c, 93). 
Polarity underscores the fragility, provisionality and temporariness of every textual 
medium—including law—and expresses an unremitting willingness to revise, rethink 
and renew our social conditioning, historical contextualization, and epistemic and 
discursive formations (Eggert 1999).
In sum,  Lawrence believed (and Manderson agrees) that we should not try to 
eliminate or conciliate contradictory beliefs, arguments or expectations, but rather 
draw our strength from them. ‘A man’s soul is a perpetual call and answer’, he writes. 
(Lawrence 1923, 31). Polarity is precisely the main tenet of the post-positivist 
conception of the rule of law that Manderson names, after Kangaroo, ‘Thirroul of 
Law’. Call and answer: the rule of law consists in a public debate of (legal) reasons 
that acknowledges the unfeasibility of interpretative closure in face of the plurality 
and singularity of circumstances that characterize legal work. Manderson argues 
that the literary modernism of Bakhtin and Lawrence entails a crucial public 
dimension through which the pressure of conveying and justifying our judgments 
to others transforms our understanding of the rule of law into ‘a set of ideas that 
institutionally protect the social and dialogic process of exposing and critiquing 
reasons for decision, rather than as a set of ideas that institutionally entrench the 
hierarchical or hieratical process of announcing them’ (Manderson 2012a, 159).
According to Manderson, Derrida makes a similar point when he addresses 
the unavoidable aporias that burden legal judgment: ‘for a decision to be just and 
responsible, it must […] be regulated and without regulation: it must conserve 
the law and also destroy or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, 
rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation 
of its principle’. (Manderson 2012a, 166; Derrida 1990, 961). In other words, legal 
judgment is permanently torn between two contradictory directions: on the one 
hand, the abstract rule; on the other hand, the uniqueness of the particular case 
that cannot be settled in advance. Legal judgment cannot choose ‘between justice 
(infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry) and the exercise of 
justice as law or right, […] calculable, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions’ 
(Derrida 1990, 959). The endless cycle of tensions, oppositions and disagreements 
between prior rules and new circumstances render legal decision basically unstable 
and imperfect.
Manderson’s approach to law and literature is deeply bound up in our present 
imperfection, our fragmentation and the imperfection and fragmentation of justice 
with us. Manderson opposes the configuration of ‘Thirroul of Law’ both against 
positivists’ assertion of law’s perfection and the romantics’ of its perfectibility—the 
former ‘a claim of purity centered on the past’ and the second ‘a dream of it focused 
on the future’ (Manderson 2012a, 178). The reconfiguration of the positivist rule 
of law into the post-positivist ‘Thirroul of Law’ has therefore, at least, three salient 
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features. First, ‘the rule of law is not the outcome of a foundation, but a process 
of continually putting them [foundations] in question’. Secondly, ‘the rule of law is 
governed by reasons rather than a singular or categorical reason’. Thirdly, ‘the rule of 
law does not present commandments that are handed down to us, but a discourse by 
which the law learns from us, paying attention to new circumstances and individual 
lives’. (Manderson 2012a, 179-180).
This way, ‘Thirroul of Law’  moves beyond romantic transcendence by 
accepting that we have not lost the foundations of law, but have always lacked them 
(Manderson 2012a, 150-152). Manderson concludes that ‘Thirroul of Law’ does not 
advance certainty, but actually enshrines uncertainty by acknowledging ‘trial and 
error’ as the legal method par excellence, and argument and doubt as a mark of 
success. (Manderson 2012, 23; 2012c, 50).
Manderson’s Kangaroo Courts must be read not only as a keystone for an 
authentic renaissance of the field of law and literature, but also as a groundbreaking 
contribution to contemporary jurisprudence that interrogates and challenges the 
very language in which we are used to think about law. It seems to me, however, that 
Manderson’s judgment of legal positivism is a bit too harsh. A more nuanced vision of 
both positivism’s emancipatory horizons and discursive limits results by introducing 
a slight hue in Manderson’s theses on the legal legacy of modernism: modernity is 
not unique, and its crises are plural. In this non-Eurocentric sense, modernities entail 
several competing master narratives and cultural contextualizations that result in 
multiple legal crises. Thus, positivism can still represent an adequate response to 
the problem of justice depending on the circumstances of particular contexts that 
are determined altogether through social institutions and systems, social agents, 
and cultural and symbolic forms. Let us remember, for example, that positivism 
played a major role in undermining the legal and jurisprudential discourses that 
structured the dictatorship of Francisco Franco in Spain (Díaz 1975) or the Junta 
regime in Argentina (Alchuorrón and Bulygin 1975). By considering a single crisis 
of modernity, Manderson narrowed the scope of his call to rethink the rule of law 
to the singularity of the Australian postcolonial modernity where the positivist rule 
of law and the liberal public sphere were, since the time in which Lawrence wrote 
Kangaroo, ongoing—though imperfect—realities.
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